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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

the policy was intended to protect the insured in his conduct as
a deputy.
The court, further, in its opinion, laid down the familiar rule
of construction that "in a case where it can be fairly claimed
that two constructions can be placed upon the language used in
the policy, it is equally well settled that the one is to be adopted
which is most favorable to the insured, and, in case of doubt as
to the meaning of the terms employed by the company, they are
to be construed most strongly against the insurer." The rule
is the same as that adopted by the American Law Institute in
its Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 232 (d), and is one
that is frequently cited by our courts. Mikam v. Norwich Union
Indemnity Company, 107 W. Va. 574, 149 S. E. 668; Copen v. Fire
Insurance Company, 107 W. Va. 608, 149 S. E. 830; Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Turlington, 140 Va. 748, 125 S.
E. 658.
There is hardly any question but that the words of the policy
here could, by a liberal interpretation, be held to cover the hazard
involved in the principal case; yet the court found against the
insured. The court has evidently disregarded the rule for the
particular case, and yet wished to approve of it so that they might
be able to use it in another case if they find need of it.
-] ARRIET L. FRENCH.

PrzADn --MsJonqDER op PARTmS DEENDAT.-In a recent case
the assignee of a non-negotiable instrument sued the maker and
his assignor jointly. The maker alone appeared and demurred to
the declaration on the ground of mis-joinder of parties defendant.
The lower court sustained the demurrer, and the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the ruling. In so holding,
the court expressly disapproved of syllabus 1 of Hunt v. Mounts,
101 W. Va. 205, 135 S. E. 323, and syllabus 2 of Urton v. Hunter,
2 W. Va. 83, "in so far as they may be construed as holding that
a mis-joinder of parties defendant in an action ex-contractu must
be made the subject of a plea in abatement". Stewart v. Tams,
151 S. E. 849 (W. Va. 1930).
The opinion of the court in overruling these two cases upon
this point follows closely the criticism of them published by Mr.
Leo Carlin in an article in 33 WEST VmGINiA LAw QUARTERLY 101.
In his discussion of the case Mr. Carlin collected the decisions
in the state, and pointed out that these two cases were inconsistent
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with other decisions of our court as well as with the common
law rules of mis-joinder. Haris v. North, 78 W. Va. 76, 88 S. E.
603; Bolyard v. Bolyard, 79 W. Va. 554, 91 S. E. 529.
The case, however, is an interesting illustration of the injustices
that can arise from following the technical common law rules of
mis-joinder. In this case, a party, against whom the plaintiff
undoubtedly had a just claim, was allowed to take advantage of
a mis-joinder that was in no way prejudicial to him and, if anything, was in his favor. It rather shocks our sensibilities to see
the plaintiff's case thrown out of court upon such a technicality.
There has been a decided move in this country, following the
lead to England, to liberalize rules of procedure in regard to
joinder of claims and allowing counter-claims. Mr. E. R. Sunderland in an article in 18 MICHIGAN LAW REvEW 571, and Mr. William
Wirt Blume in an article in 26 MCHIGAN LAW Rr. sw 1, have very
forcefully answered any arguments in favor of the technical
common law rules, and, with equal force, have advocated unlimited freedom of joinder. Their argument is that in considering
a question of joinder, or in allowing a counter-claim in a case
the only questions to be decided are (1) Can the court conveniently
despatch the matters joined in this action? and (2) Will there
be any resulting prejudice to the parties involved? If the question is argued from these standpoints, and the court is of the
opinion that it can conveniently decide the issues involved, and
that there will be no prejudice caused thereby, it is submitted
that there is no good reason for objecting to the joinder or to
the allowance of the counter-claim. A case should stand or fall
upon its merits-not upon some technical rule of procedure.
This view has been advocated by the Committee on Judicial
Administration and Legal Reform of the West Virginia Bar Association in its reports before the Association last fall, and published

in 36 WEST VRniA LAW QuARTERLY 1.
The proposed draft of the REvisED CODE, ch. 56, §34, changed
our rules on non-joinder and mis-joinder to some extent, but as
this issue goes to press it is not known just what rule was finally
passed. The proposed law was to this effect: "No action or suit
shall abate or be defeated by the mis-joinder or non-joinder of
parties, plaintiff or defendant. Whenever such mis-joinder shall
be made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the parties mis-joined
shall be dropped by order of the court, entered of its own record, or
upon motion, at any stage of the cause".
It is submitted that, although this proposed change will probably alleviate the difficulties to some extent, it does not go far
enough. It still requires the court to determine whether or not
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there is a mis-joinder or non-joinder. The emphasis is still upon
the old rules of joinder, and not placed where it is believed that
it should be, that is upon the basis of convenieney of the court
and prejudice to the parties.
-HAmuntm
L. FRmcm.

TRANsFER Or PROPERTY IN TRUST AS A

MHOD OF ESCAPING

TA.xES.-Is it possible to transfer property to a non-resident in
trust for a resident and thus escape taxes altogether? No. But
might it thus be possible to substitute the taxation law of a foreign
state for that of our own? In a case recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court the facts and holding were as
follows: One K, a resident of Virginia, transferred and delivered
to a trust company of Baltimore, Maryland, stocks and bonds of
various corporations to the amount of $50,000 with power to
change the investments, collect and accumulate the income, and
pay the same together with the principal in this manner: Onehalf to each of K's sons (residents of Virginia) when they should
respectively become of the age of twenty-five years. Virginia
assessed taxes for the years 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925 upon
the whole corpus of the estate against the trust company. The
United States Supreme Court, citing authorities, stated that the
property as such was only taxable at the residence of the owner,
and that the trust company, having the legal title and control,
was the owner, and, therefore, that these intangibles were taxable
in Maryland. The court held that the cestuis, not having present
control of the property, were not the owners, and, therefore, -the
property was not taxable in Virginia. The court did state, however, that the question of whether Virginia could tax the equitable
interest of the cestuis, was not presented for adjudication, but intimated that "Virginia, following its own view of vested and contingent interests, might tax the interests of these beneficiaries as
though they were the whole, but it is sufficient for present purposes
that it has not assumed to do so."
Thus it seems certain that one may not dodge taxes altogether
by transferring the property, title, and control to a foreign trustee,
for by so doing the property is made subject to taxation at the
trustee's residence. There is a possibility, however, that the
application of the tax laws of a foreign state may be substituted
for that of one's own state, provided the latter state would not
assume to tax the equitable interest remaining, in which case the
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